

VIA: _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

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TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 30 AUG 1962

FROM : Chief of Station, Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART

SPECIFIC— Visit with Sicherungsgruppe Chief 7 July 1955

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Ref: ECQA-62689
FRAN-1234, et seq.

1. Dr. Ernst BRUECKNER, Chief of the Sicherungsgruppe of the BKA, was seen in the office of Reg. Dir. Paul DICKOFF, acting president of the BKA on 7 July 1955. This was an unscheduled meeting in place of one which had been planned in Bonn but had not materialized. BRUECKNER was on his way back to Bonn after having been in Munich, Karlsruhe, and Stuttgart in connection with the arrest of agents resulting from the statements of Herbert Eugen WEINMANN. The small amount of information imparted on this case has been reported in the traffic connected with reference B. The only interesting detail to add is that according to DICKOPF, WEINMANN had been sentenced in absentia by a Berlin court for large scale blackmarket activities and was listed in the Fahndungsbuch, on the basis of which he had been arrested (exact date still not known to us). His precise motivation in revealing his extensive knowledge of SFS lines into the Federal Republic is not known, other than his desire to make a bargain to gain freedom from prosecution. DICKOPF indicated that some arrangement will doubtless be made, but the Oberbundesanwalt has not yet committed himself as to precisely what it will be.

2. HEINZ case. BRUECKNER reported that "X", of the attachment to reference A had been arrested since our last talk and his entire story found to be a mass of lies. Under SG interrogation the man confessed that not only had he no contact with DDR personalities, but his personal background was fancily embroidered as well. BRUECKNER said this was highly embarrassing to him inasmuch as the arrest of both Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ and (Frl.) WIEDE had been based on "X's" information. The file has been returned by the OBA to Bonn, and BRUECKNER has promised us the reports as soon as the worst of the WEINMANN storm is over.

3. Rote Kapelle. Pressed as to how we could go about getting a copy of Staatsanwalt FINCK's report on the Rote Kapelle, BRUECKNER said that the original report was over 1000 typewritten pages. The political implications of the report were so explosive that the Oberstaatsanwalt of Niedersachsen had ordered the report rewritten eliminating much of the controversial material. The revised version runs to some 300 pages and is regarded as the official one. BRUECKNER said that although FINCK still has a copy of the long report, there was no way by which access could be had to it outside of an official request to the OSA of Niedersachsen, who, if he were willing to make any release at all, would doubtless only release the official report. He felt it was useless to try to approach FINCK directly since the man is still in office and therefore bound by

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the ethics of that office. It was BRUECKNER's opinion that ZIPPER had probably been able to get the long report. Asked if he would be able to borrow the original report, BRUECKNER said he would have to go through the same official channels as we and would be given only the official version. We regard this incident as closed unless a cogent suggestion is advanced for obtaining the original.

4. Police Matters. The major portion of the meeting was spent on this, the favorite subject of both men. There were few new ideas advanced, although some interested expatiation on old ones. The recurring themes were familiar: lack of men in the Interior Ministry with any comprehension of police problems; lack of jurisdictional definition; incompetence of local police in complicated cases extending beyond their area; lack of any response from the Ministry to extensive reports written by experts recommending changes in the existing system (there has still been no direct response to the report attached to EGQA-59119, nor to a recent report by BRUECKNER on the ~~allegality~~ of the Sicherungsgruppe, nor to a November 1954 report by DICKOPF and BRUECKNER on the suggested integration of the political reporting system. (See Att A).

5. BRUECKNER seemed greatly discouraged by the red tape with which he has to deal. He stated several times he would not continue much longer under the present circumstances. He cited the exploitation of his understaffed officials who do not even have the satisfaction of having a legal basis for their work, which leaves ^{them} individually and collectively fair game for arbitrary action from hostile politicians. He is tired of seeing good men work massive hours of overtime without having their compensation brought into line even with relatively low level local police officials. It was stated in answer to a question, that the OBA, who directs the Sicherungsgruppe in most of its political police activities, cannot improve the situation. He can recommend only through channels, i.e., the Justice Ministry. The Justice Ministry consults the Interior Minister and the latter, not being an expert himself, must rely on the advice of incompetents in his own ministry. Thus, any expert recommendations for ameliorating the inadequacies of the present system are lost in the circle of confusion and frustration created by a bureaucracy trying to perpetuate itself, and resisting all attacks and attempted incursions from without.

6. As a particularly pertinent example of their problem at the Ministry, the men cited (Dr.) WILHELM BITTERLEHN, head of Avt. VI A 4 of the Ministry, an Oberlandesgerichtsrat a.D., who seems totally incapable of comprehending the matters presented to him whether orally or in writing. His reaction is to place everything he does not understand in his HOLD box until he has time for reflection. Among other things now reposing there is the second letter from Mr. STEWART, the NATO security representative to the Federal Republic asking what steps the Fedrep intends to take to implement the NATO security requirements and stressing the necessity for coordination among the various agencies

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where information relevant to security checks can be expected to be found. In this connection, DICKOFF referred to the meeting in Bonn (see Att B) at which Stewart first presented his views. This, too, was the first time DICKOFF had had an opportunity to air his own grievances for the benefit of official listeners outside the Ministry. STEWART was considerably impressed by DICKOFF's tale of woe. He reported that he had held talks in a number of agencies and ministries, always below the minister level, and that he had always had a hearing, but he had the strong impression he was talking down a well. There appeared to be no one interested in or qualified to take an activist role in implementing the NATO requirements. He also lamented the lack of a strong man with experience in internal security matters. DICKOFF interpolated here that he feared even a strong man would be gobbled up by the predatory bureaucrats who in self defense would drown in red tape anyone who posed a threat to them individually or collectively. DICKOFF remarked he had been impressed with George R. Offenbach's performance at the meeting at which the latter indicated if the Fedrep reply to their letters were not satisfactory, they would continue to write letters until they did receive replies indicating progress. DICKOFF applauded this approach saying that the only salvation for the German system now must come from outside. Progress from within the foreseeable future is inextricably bogged down in regionalism ("the curse of an imposed Federalism"). He urges that the needle be kept in the Ministry officials on the working level by both U. S. and NATO authorities.

7. BRUECKNER commented that his man (fnu) VOGEL, who was in the United States in connection with the Chancellor's last trip had been well treated by an American whose name he did not recall, but whom BRUECKNER assumed belonged to KUBARK. He expressed his appreciation for this courtesy recalling as he did so his own pleasant trip under the escort of []

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8. Future of ZIPPER: Some time was spent in recounting the problems that beset UTILITY in the matter of legalization. Both men said the greatest problem was that of subordination. The organization could not be placed under any ministry because such an arrangement would be unacceptable to the other ministries. Politically it would raise a storm to place it directly under the Chancellor, since most quarters held that he already had too much power concentrated in his hands. They both favored the idea of a National Security Council arrangement, but stated that the problem of the makeup of such a body would be continuously subjected to political wrangling and obstructionism and that even such a body must be subordinated to some authority ultimately. They did not feel that subordination of ZIPPER to a parliamentary committee was compatible with the security concepts which such an organization must represent. They cited further that UTILITY has no bureaucratic experience, and hence little idea of the incursions which such agencies as the Bundesrechnungshof, trade unions, and tax authorities can and certainly will make upon ZIPPER security

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and operating efficiency. In connection with the trade unions, incidentally, they cited the Personalvertretungsgesetz (Personnel Representation Law) which provided a shop council which had a strong influence in hirings, firings, and promotions, and which, if passed (it has since been passed in a somewhat milder form) would cause great security headaches to all organizations which handled sensitive and classified information. DICKOPF stated his belief that even if UTILITY spent all his time politicking, he would still find himself caught in an inextricable web of intrigue, jealousy, and enmity from many bureaucratic directions which would have the end effect of stultifying his best efforts.

(COMMENT: Reporting subsequent to 7 July has overtaken much of the above material which is presented primarily to complete the record.)



Attachments:

Att A, Part I: Organization of the Intelligence Services of the Political Police and the Criminal Police at the Federal Level. (In original German)

" , Part III: English translation of Part I

" , Part III: Chart

Att B: "Memo for the Record" re mtg on "German Protection of U. S. Classified Military Information."

Distribution:

3-EE w/ Att A (Parts I, II, and III) and Att B

2-Bonn w/Att A (Parts II and III)

2-POB w/Att A (Parts II and III) and Att B

30 August 1955
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